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Promoting eyewitness testimony quality: Warning vs. reinforced self-affi rmation 
as methods of reduction of the misinformation effect
Abstract: In a typical experiment on the misinformation effect, subjects fi rst watch some event, afterwards read a description 
of it which in the experimental group includes some incorrect details, and answer questions relating to the original event. 
Typically, subjects in the misled experimental group report more false details than those from the control group.
The main purpose of the presented study was to compare two methods of reducing the misinformation effect, namely – 
warning against misinformation and reinforced self-affi rmation. The reinforced self-affi rmation consists of two elements: 
the participants recall their greatest achievements of life, and are being given a positive feedback about their performance 
in a memory task.
The obtained results showed that the reinforced self-affi rmation was more effective than warning, although the latter also 
caused a signifi cant reduction of the vulnerability to misinformation.
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The misinformation effect consists in the decrement in 
eyewitness report accuracy arising after exposure to mis-
information concerning the original event. Technically, it 
refers to including by a witness into his/her testimony de-
tails inconsistent with the original event, originating from 
sources other than the event itself (Polczyk, under revi-
sion). This phenomenon has been widely explored since 
early seventies (seminal work: Loftus, Miller & Burns, 
1978; Pezdek, 1977). 
The typical experimental procedure used to explore 
the misinformation effect consists of three phases. In the 
fi rst phase, participants typically watch a video clip or a se-
quence of slides, which is called “original material”. Next, 
they are exposed to the postevent material which, in the ex-
perimental group, contains some misleading information. 
For example, in the original material the robber had a gun, 
but it was said in the postevent material that he had a knife. 
Afterwards, subjects are asked to answer questions about 
original material, including questions referring to the mis-
led details. Numerous experiments using various modifi ca-
tions of this basic paradigm confi rmed and replicated the 
fi nding that the accuracy of misled subjects as regards the 
misleading questions is much lower compared to non-mis-
led ones (for a review, see: Loftus, 2005; Polczyk, 2007; 
Wright & Loftus, 1998).
The misinformation effect is being intensively re-
searched, mainly because of its obvious relevance for the 
applied forensic psychology. It may also be relevant e.g. for 
political psychology, advertising or marketing (compare: 
Braun, Ellis & Loftus, 2002; Loftus & Banaji, 1989).
The main areas of the research on the misinformation 
effect deal with analyzing the mechanisms of the misinfor-
mation effect (e.g. Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Blank, 1998; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) and its determinants (for a 
review see: Polczyk, 2007). Another important area con-
cerns the methods or procedures by which the misinforma-
tion effect might be reduced. Such research is extremely 
important as the vulnerability to misinformation is a phe-
nomenon of obvious importance for the applied forensic 
psychology. However, the literature on such methods is 
scarce. As reducing the misinformation effect is the main 
topic of the present article, we provide a review of existent 
ideas or methods how to reduce the misinformation effect.
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Reducing misinformation effect
Warning against misinformation. This is the most 
straightforward idea for inoculating against misinformation 
in the context of eyewitness memory and misinformation 
effect, still researched nowadays, studied experimentally 
from the very beginning of the research on the misinforma-
tion effect. It consists in warning subjects against possible 
discrepancies between the original and postevent materi-
als. 
The fi rst experiment on warning of this kind was pre-
sented by Greene, Flynn and Loftus (1982). They pointed 
to four possible reasons, why warning may reduce vulner-
ability to misinformation. First, if warning is presented be-
fore the original event, it may make the participants memo-
rize the content of the original material better, making it 
therefore more resistant to misinformation. Second, if the 
warning was issued after presenting the original event, it 
might have made the subjects to rehearse its content, there-
fore improving the memory of it and increasing resistance 
against misinformation. Third, warning may cause a more 
thorough processing of the postevent material. Finally, 
warning may result in a more careful answering the ques-
tions included in fi nal test. 
To verify these options, Greene et al. (1982, Experiment 
1) conducted an experiment in which the moment of warn-
ing was manipulated: before the original material, between 
the original and postevent materials; after the postevent 
material and before the fi nal test, or not at all. Greene et al. 
(1982) found that the resistance to misinformation was the 
greatest in the group who received the warning before read-
ing the postevent text. Finally, Greene et al. concluded that 
the effectiveness of warning consists in deep and thought-
ful processing the postevent material.
Further research into the warning as a method of reduc-
ing the misinformation effect produced mixed results, from 
a total elimination of yielding to misinformation (Lind-
say & Johnson, 1989), to the complete lack of its effi cacy 
(Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen & Toglia, 2001; Zaragoza 
& Lane, 1994) Some light on this issue may be shed by 
the results of an experiment conducted by Polczyk (2007), 
who found that warning was effective in the case of a very 
distinct and vivid original detail, but not in the case of an 
item which was diffi cult to notice in the original material. 
This result suggests that an important prerequisite for the 
warning to be effective is the ability to detect discrepancies 
between the original and postevent materials. If the original 
detail is very diffi cult to detect, for example because it is 
quite peripheral, warned subjects simply do not know what 
is the misinformation. If, on the other hand, the original 
detail is easy to spot, it is also easy to detect discrepancies. 
In such a situation, warning against discrepancies directly 
informs the subjects what is the wrong answer.
Some paradoxical effects of warning subjects should 
be mentioned here, namely, the tainted truth effect (Ech-
terhoff, Groll & Hirst, 2007). It consists in poorer memory 
functioning among persons who were not misled, yet they 
were warned against nonexistent inconsistencies between 
the original and postevent materials.
Cognitive interview. In its current form (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992), the cognitive interview includes several 
techniques aiming at establishing a good rapport between 
the interviewee and the interviewer and enhancing good 
communication. It also includes four memory techniques: 
mental reinstating of the context of the event, reporting 
everything, recounting events in the reverse chronological 
order, and adopting different perspectives while recalling 
events, e.g. as if the eyewitness “saw” the event from a 
different place. In a number of research, the cognitive inter-
view proved to enhance the quality of testimony substan-
tially (a review: Memon, Meissner & Fraser, 2010).
Some studies indicated that the cognitive interview may 
be promising as a method of reducing the vulnerability to 
misinformation, although not all empirical fi ndings con-
fi rmed it. 
For example, Holliday and Albon (2004) found that 
the cognitive interview reduced susceptibility to misinfor-
mation in children. Holliday, Humphries, Milne, Memon, 
Houlder, Lyons and Bull (in press) reported that it was ef-
fective in reducing the misinformation effect among elder-
ly people. However, it’s effi cacy proved to be poor among 
adults (Centofanti & Reece, 2006).
Arousal. In just one research it turned out that arousal 
induced after presenting misinformation may inoculate 
against it (English & Nielson, 2010). In this research, after 
the original material and the misinformation, the partici-
pants watched a fi lm clip, which in one group was arous-
ing (a live-action oral surgery), in the other was neutral. 
English and Nielson (2010) found that when tested for the 
memory of the original event one week later, the partici-
pants who watched the arousing clip yielded to signifi cant-
ly fewer misinformation items than the group who did not 
watch the arousing clip.
Reinforced self-affi rmation. In 2012, Szpitalak designed 
a method for reducing the vulnerability to misinformation, 
which she called reinforced self-affi rmation (RSA). It is 
based on a situational improvement of a person’s self-es-
teem, accomplished by a combination of self-affi rmation 
and positive feedback. Self-affi rmation consists in making 
the participants write down all their greatest life achieve-
ments, whereas positive feedback results from a manipulat-
ed memory task (see detailed description in the Procedure 
below).
The main premise for developing such a procedure was 
the assumption that an enhancement of the self-esteem, 
even temporary, causes an enhancement of self-confi dence. 
In other words, it was expected that thinking about one’s 
achievements activates positive self-image, which is con-
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fi rmed by getting positive feedback from an “objective” 
source (from the experimenter) results in greater self-con-
fi dence. The greater self-confi dence should in turn lead to 
a greater resistance to infl uence. It should be so because 
enhanced self-confi dence should be connected with lesser 
need for relying on external opinions, cues and sugges-
tions when making any decisions. A self-confi dent person 
should be prone to use his/her own judgment and therefore 
be less likely to yield to outer infl uence, including infl u-
ence in the form of the misinformation about formerly seen 
events. This assumption is already somewhat supported 
by existing data, for example, Saunders (2012) found that 
low self-esteem (as measured by Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem 
Scale (1965) is connected with higher yielding to misin-
formation.
The RSA proved very effective in reducing the misin-
formation effect. In sum, until now its effi cacy was repli-
cated in seven experiments (Szpitalak, 2012; Szpitalak & 
Polczyk, in press; Szpitalak & Polczyk, under revision). 
Moreover, it proved effective also outside the context of the 
memory misinformation effect, namely, in making persons 
more resistant to the door-in-the-face technique (Szpitalak, 
Polczyk & Cyganiewicz, under revision). The door-in-the-
face technique consists in fi rst making a large request, dif-
fi cult to accomplish. If a person rejects the large request 
(which he/she usually does), he/she becomes more prone 
to accomplish a smaller request compared to a situation in 
which the smaller request was not preceded by the large 
one (Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis, Catalan, Wheeler & Darby, 
1975). In the experiment by Szpitalak et al. (under revi-
sion) the RSA reduced the effi cacy of this technique to the 
level of a group in which the smaller request was not pre-
ceded by a large one.
It is worth noting that none of the both elements of the 
RSA, that is, the self-affi rmation and the positive feedback 
seems to be effective when applied separately: people who 
did a self-affi rmation but were not given a positive feed-
back were not more resistant to misinformation than those 
who did not a self-affi rmation (Szpitalak, 2012). Similarly, 
the positive feedback without self-affi rmation did not pro-
duce any reduction of the misinformation effect (Szpitalak, 
2012). Thus, it seems that only the combination of “inter-
nal” and “external” sources really enhances self-esteem: 
the self-affi rmation done by the participant him/herself and 
positive feedback obtained from somebody else gives a cu-
mulative effect needed for a real effect. 
Hypotheses
In the presented experiment we wanted to compare two 
methods of reducing the misinformation effect – warning 
and reinforced self-affi rmation. First of all, we wanted to 
replicate the misinformation effect. Thus, in the fi rst hy-
pothesis we assumed that the mean number of answers con-
sistent with misinformation would be higher in the misled 
group, compared to the control one. Secondly, we expected 
that warning against discrepancies between original and 
postevent materials would cause increased resistance to 
misinformation. In other words, the mean number of an-
swers consistent with misinformation should be lower in 
the warned misled group than in the non-warned misled 
group. 
Thirdly, we assumed that the effi cacy of the RSA would 
be replicated – the mean number of answers consistent with 
misinformation ought to be lower in the group in which 
RSA was administered, compared to the misled group 
without RSA. It is important to note that in the planned 
research the RSA was placed after exposing the postevent 
material. In the majority of experiments performed so far 
(e.g. Szpitalak, 2012; Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2012), it took 
place before the postevent material. It is however important 
to verify whether it is effective when placed after the misin-
formation. Otherwise it would be diffi cult to make any use 
from it in real life situations. In practice, any technique di-
rected at immunizing against misinformation may only be 
administered after the witness has already been exposed to 
possible false information, for example in the mass media, 
TV, or other witnesses.
We could fi nd no premises as to what method of re-
ducing the misinformation effect should be more effective 
- the warning or the reinforced self-affi rmation. Thus, the 




Two hundred and nine (127 female, 82 male) students 
(except psychology students) took part in the experiment. 
Mean age was 19.17 (SD = 1.75). No gratifi cation for the 
participation was given. The participants were recruited 
mainly from the university database and participated for 
credit points.
Materials
The original material: an audio recording (male voice) 
of a duration of 1 min 57 sec, presenting the fi ctious 
“planned reform”, consisting in introducing a fi nal 
exam at the end of the education. The speaker, intru-
duced as one of the creators of the reform, elaborated on 
various advanteges of introducing such an exam; thus, 
the speech was informative but also persuasive
The postevent material: a description of the original 
material, which in the experimental group contained six 
misleading details.
The memory test - a set of 10 open-ended questions, 
including six critical ones.
A list of 60 nouns from various categories to remember, 
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Fillers (unrelated questionnaires), not connected with 
the aim of the study, used to fi ll in time intervals be-
tween the parts of the procedure
Procedure 
The experimental design used in the study was 2 × 3 
(misinformation: present / absent; manipulation: warn-
ing / RSA / none). The experiment was run in groups 
from 4 to 11 participants. The experimenter introduced 
herself as a scientist from the Jagiellonian University, 
performing research for the National Council for Higher 
Education, concerning a “planned reform of Polish uni-
versities”. Similar procedure was used earlier by Apsler 
and Sears (1968) and Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman 
(1981). The experimenter explained the purpose of the 
planned reform and afterwards the participants listened 
to a recording about it. In order to make the procedure 
more plausible, the subjects were asked to give written 
opinions about the reform. After 15 minutes, partici-
pants read a description of the recording which for half 
of them included six misleading items. For example, the 
Jagiellonian University mentioned in the original ma-
terial was replaced in the postevent material with the 
University of Bialystok. Then, in the group with the 
RSA, the first phase of this procedure was performed: 
the participants were asked to write down the greatest 
achievements of their lives (as many as they wanted). 
The subjects were given the following rationale for the 
filler questionnaires, as well as for the procedure of re-
inforced self-affirmation: “We would like to research 
the determinants of the attitude toward the planned 
reform” Afterwards, they were asked to memorize as 
many words from a list of 60 words as they were able 
to. After two minutes they had to write down all words 
they could recall and were given positive feedback 
about their performance, namely, they were told that an 
average number of remembered words among persons 
of the same age is 9.3. This number was false – in order 
to give positive feedback, it was about 1.5 SD lower 
than real average number noted in the pilot study. This 
constituted the second part of the RSA procedure.
In the same time, the participants from the control and 
the warning groups were to make a written description of 
the way from their house to the lab. They were also asked 
to memorize as many words from a list of 60 words as they 
were able to, but were not given any feedback. After 10 
minutes, the participants were given the fi nal memory test, 
presented as the “last task to be completed”which in the 
warning group was preceded by a written warning against 
possible discrepancies between the original and postevent 
materials.
To sum up, there were three groups of participants (both 
in the misled and non-misled groups): with RSA, with 
warning, and without any manipulation directed to reduce 
the susceptibility to misinformation. 
5. Results
The open-ended answers in the fi nal test were recod-
ed as: “1” - answer consistent with misinformation; “0” 
- all other answers or lack of answer. The answers “1” 
were summed up across all six critical questions, giving 
a numeric estimate of the susceptibility to misinformation 
ranging from 0 to 6. In Table 1 descriptive statistics for the 
mean number of answers consistent with misinformation 
are presented. 
Table 1. The mean number of answers consistent with 
misinformation
Levels of factors Answers consistent to misinformation Factor or interaction 
Method M
N
Mean SD 95% CI 
Method none 67 1.43 1.85 0.99 - 1.88 
Method warning 76 1.26 1.56 0.91 - 1.62 
Method RSA 66 1.03 1.44 0.68 - 1.38 
M non-misled 97 0.20 0.42 0.11 - 0.28 
M misled 112 2.15 1.72 1.83 - 2.47 
Method × M none non-misled 36 0.06 0.23 -0.02 - 0.13 
Method × M none misled 31 3.03 1.56 2.46 - 3.60 
Method × M warning non-misled 35 0.26 0.44 0.10 - 0.41 
Method × M warning misled 41 2.12 1.66 1.60 - 2.65 
Method × M RSA non-misled 26 0.31 0.55 0.09 - 0.53 
Method × M RSA misled 40 1.50 1.63 0.98 - 2.02 
L d
Legend:
Method: method of reducing the susceptibility to misinformation
M – misinformation 
RSA – reinforced self-affi rmation
The fi rst hypothesis was verifi ed by computing the main 
effect of the infl uence of misinformation on the number of 
answers consistent with misinformation. The hypothesis 
was confi rmed, as the difference between the misled and 
control group was signifi cant and quite remarkable in its 
magnitude (F[1,203] = 138.01; p < 0.001; n
2
p
 = 0.40). Then, 
the interaction between misinformation and manipulation 
was analyzed; it was statistically signifi cant (F[2,203] = 8.86; 
p < 0.001; n2p
 = 0.08; see: Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Mean number of answers consistent with misinformation as a 
function of presence vs. absence of misinformation and the methods of 
reducing the misinformation effect (signifi cant differences are marked 
with arrows).
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The results of planned comparisons comparing all com-
binations of levels of factors are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
As can be seen in Table 2, misled subjects performed worse 
from control ones regardless of the method of reducing the 
misinformation effect. Of greater importance however are 
the comparisons done in the misled group among various 
combinations of methods of reducing the misinformation 
effect, presented in Table 3 and visualized on Figure 1. 
To start with, misled warned persons were more resis-
tant to misinformation then those from the control group, 
which confi rms the hypothesis two (see Table 3). The third 
hypothesis was also confi rmed – participants engaged in 
the reinforced self-affi rmation procedure were less suscep-
tible to misinformation than participants from the control 
group. Finally, RSA proved more effective in reducing the 
misinformation effect than did the warning (Table 3).
Table 2. Comparisons between misled and non-misled 
groups in the mean number of answers consistent to 
misinformation across all combinations of methods of 
reducing the misinformation effect
noticing that there are also results suggesting that warning 
might be ineffective (e.g. Neuschatz et al., 2001; Zaragoza 
& Lane, 1994). As mentioned in the Introduction, accord-
ing to Polczyk (2007), warning can only be effective if a 
person is aware of the discrepancies between original mate-
rial and misinformation. Unfortunately, the three-step pro-
cedure used in the presented experiment does not allow for 
replicating this fi nding. 
An important fi nding of the present study is the replica-
tion of the effectiveness of the reinforced self-affi rmation 
procedure in reducing the misinformation effect, applied 
after the postevent material. As was mentioned in the In-
troduction, the RSA proved successful in reducing the mis-
information effect many times (Szpitalak, 2012; Szpitalak 
& Polczyk, in press), but in most of the research it was 
applied before the postevent material. This somewhat lim-
its the practical usefulness of the RSA as a method of im-
munizing eyewitnesses against misinformation, because in 
reality any infl uence can be exerted on a witness after he/
she had already been exposed to possible misinformation. 
When a witness is being interviewed at a police station, 
he/she might have already been exposed to any amount 
of information about the event he/she is telling about. Be-
cause of that, if the RSA were only effi cient when applied 
before the postevent material, its practical value would be 
doubtful. Fortunately, this is not the case: in the research 
presented in this article, RSA reduced the vulnerability to 
misinformation when applied after it. This is a replication 
of the results obtained by Szpitalak (2012). 
Introducing the RSA after the postevent material comes 
with the cost of diffi culties with comparing the results with 
those stemming from research in which RSA was placed 
between the original and postevent materials. Such com-
parisons cannot be made with the present results and re-
quire further research.
Reinforced self-affi rmation was more effi cient in re-
ducing the vulnerability to misinformation than warning 
the participants against possible discrepancies between the 
original event and the description of it. Trying to explain 
this fact, we may start with analyzing the very mechanism 
by which a warning works. As described in the Introduc-
tion, the effi cacy of a warning was attributed to, for exam-
ple, deeper and more thoughtful processing of the postevent 
material (Greene et al., 1982). As a result, more discrepan-
cies might have been discovered by a participants, allowing 
him/her to choose the correct answer. This however is only 
effective if the subject is quite sure what was presented in 
the original material, and what was mentioned in the poste-
vent text. When the participant feels that different infor-
mation was presented in the original and postevent mate-
rials, but is not confi dent about his/her memory, the fi nal 
answer may still be wrong. The greater effi ciency of RSA 
may be based on the processing of items about which the 
participants are not confi dent whether their own memory is 
correct. In the warning condition, the subjects are alerted 
Legend:
M – misinformation 
RSA – reinforced self-affi rmation
Method F df p 2p
none 98.73 1,203 < 0.001 0.49
warning 43.92 1,203 < 0.001 0.22
RSA 14.98 1,203 < 0.001 0.07
Misinformation Comparisons of methods F df p 2p
none warning 0.48 1,203 0.488 < 0.01 
none  RSA 0.64 1,203 0.424 < 0.01 Non-misled 
warning  RSA 0.03 1,203 0.873 < 0.01 
none warning 9.79 1,203  0.002 0.05
none  RSA 27.43 1,203 < 0.001 0.14Misled
warning  RSA 5.24 1,203 0.023 0.03
L d
Table 3. Differences between groups in the mean number 
of answers consistent to misinformation
Discussion
As was expected, misled persons were more vulnerable 
to misinformation than non-misled ones. This confi rmed 
the fi rst hypotheses and replicated the well-known misin-
formation effect. This is but another warning how vulner-
able the memory can be to distortions, at least in some cir-
cumstances.
The second hypothesis was also confi rmed: warning 
was effi cient in reducing the misinformation effect. This 
result is consistent with outcomes of many other studies 
(e.g. Blank, 1998; Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001; Echter-
hoff, Hirst & Hussy, 2005; Ecker, Lewandowsky & Tang, 
2010; Greene et al., 1982; Wright, 1993). It is also worth 
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to the possibility of discrepancies, but are not particularly 
motivated to process them, nor are they encouraged to trust 
their own memories. In contrast, if RSA indeed, as hypoth-
esized, enhances self-confi dence, then the processing of 
“dubious” cases may be different: when a participant is not 
absolutely sure about what he/she has seen, but in reality 
his/her remembrance is correct, the elevated self-confi -
dence may help to rely on his/her own memory, therefore 
promoting correct answers.
One question which remains open is the problem of 
time intervals between the three parts of the procedure. 
They were rather short, in order to fi t the procedure into the 
standard duration of classes in the school (45min). Whether 
the effi cacy of RSA would preserve when the time intervals 
were, say, days or weeks, is unknown at present and needs 
further research. Also, the generalizability of the results ob-
tained over other populations, for example people at differ-
ent age than students needs further research.
Another interesting question arises, if and to what extent 
are the effects of RSA generalizable, that is, whether it may 
immune against other kinds of infl uence, or just against 
mnestic misinformation effect only. In its current form the 
RSA relies heavily on memory phenomena - the positive 
feedback refers to the quality of memory. It is therefore 
possible that the effects of RSA may limit to memory phe-
nomena only. On the other hand, as mentioned in the In-
troduction, there is one experiment in which RSA proved 
successful in immunizing against quite other form of infl u-
ence, namely the “door-in-the-face” technique (Szpitalak 
et al., under revision). This result of course needs replica-
tion, but seems promising. It may suggest that although the 
RSA itself is based on memory, the resulting enhancement 
of self-confi dence may be effective behind the context of 
infl uencing memory reports. However, at present no direct 
conclusions concerning the generalizability of the RSA in 
areas other than the misinformation effect are possible. 
This problem needs further research.
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